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Observations on the Nature of Fixation in
U.K. and Dutch Copyright Law
Sophie Arkette
A dispute arising from a claim of copyright infringement of a taste was
heard in a Dutch court, the Rechtbank Gelderland, on April 2, 2015.1 Both
parties in the case are food manufacturers. Levola Hengelo, the claimant,
is known for its range of yogurt products, and Smilde Foods, the
defendant, has a long established reputation for creating sauces, quiche,
and margarine products. Levola seeks an injunction against Smilde's
product, Witte Wievenkaas, a cream cheese dip, claiming not only that
Levola's product enjoys copyright protection with respect to the judgment
given about perfume scents in Kecofa v. Lanc6me,2 but also that the taste
of Smilde's dip resembles Levola's product, Heks'nkaas, to such a degree
as to warrant a claim for infringement under Article 13 of the Dutch
Copyright Act of 1912.
The defendant, Smilde, attempts to counter Levola's argument through
a number of tactics: namely that its product is sufficiently distinct in taste
from the claimant's product and that any claim for infringement is
redundant.' Smilde also disputes the appropriateness of the Kecofa
judgment, in so far as the reference to the credibility of copyright for
scents should be viewed as an obiter dictum, and not as a prima facie
ruling for copyright subsistence of scent products.s Moreover, Levola's
claim for copyright is undermined by Smilde with respect to the product
itself. Article 10(1) of the Dutch Copyright Act provides a list of
protectable work that is subsumed within general terms as exemplified in
Article 1. Although originality is not explicitly mentioned in the
Copyright Act of 1912, it is a requirement used by the courts, with
reference to the test proposed by the Supreme Court during a 1985
hearing.6 The test required that any work considered for copyright had to
1. Rb. Gelderland (Levola Hengelo BV/Smilde Foods BV) (Neth)., docket no. 272 772 2014/603.
2. HR 16juni 2006, NJ 2006 585 (Kecofa v. Lanc6me) (Neth.).
3. Stcrt. 1912. Article 13, Act of 23 September 1912, DCA, concerns the rights of reproduction,
translation and of adaption providing the right-holder grounds to exploit the work in question.
4. Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods BV, (BR-M.FIDI337265) 24-27.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Screenoprints Ltd v. Citroen BV IEPT 19851129, HR & Supreme Court Jan 4 1991 Van Dale
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possess original character and authorial stamp, both of which arise from
the labor invested by the maker. In both counts, the defendant claims,
Levola's product fails.' It fails to be sufficiently original in its content.
This can be shown not only by the route through which Levola obtained
this product's license for distribution, but also by assessing the ingredients
used to produce Levola's overall impression against ingredients used by
its main competitors in similar cream cheese based products.
Even if it could be proven that the taste of Levola's product meets the
demands set down by the Articles of the Dutch Copyright Act, the claim
of copyright, as a monopoly right, flies in the face of the freedom of
enterprise contained within Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.' What is ultimately contested is the
principle upon which the legal statutes are based: to protect any tangible
work of authors, artists, or inventors when their right to exploit original
work goes hand-in-hand with the advancement of artistic and cultural
expression. The question in Levola v. Smilde is whether the copyright of
the sensory transmission of taste and of smell can obtain rights for
commodification.
What would the ramifications be if such an appeal were successful?
First, there would be a strong demand for courts to establish policy in the
realm of olfactory or gustatory values. Who, apart from an expert would
have sufficient knowledge to assess two similar tastes or smells? And if it
were possible to compare tastes with the degree of accuracy that could be
called proof, how might the courts determine that a substantial part of a
taste has been reproduced in another product? If taste is subject to
alteration over time-or in adverse conditions, as is the case with wine
(for instance, when the taste of a certain wine rests in part on its
interaction with the air)-at what point in the taste's life cycle is the
assessment to be made? Dutch copyright law is unusual to allow for the
contemplation of works that are, in all respects, evanescent. It is not
obvious how this state of affairs obtains, since Article 1 and Article 10(1)
give no hint of the possible inclusion of purely sensory phenomena, even
if one takes into account the basic requirement for protection, i.e., of a
work being expressed in a form that is perceptual in one or more of the
senses.9
The Dutch Copyright Act's non-exhaustive list of copyrightable works
has used the Berne Convention as its template, albeit with a few minor
alterations, such as in the realm of digital technology.o If anything,
v. Romme HR NJ 1991, 608.
7. Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods BV, (BR-M.FID1337265) 15-18.
8. Article 16, Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 16, 2000 OJ. (C364)
1. (2000/C 364/01).
9. Article I & 10(l), Dutch Copyright Act (1912).
10. Act of July 7, 1994, amending the Copyright Act (1912) with respect to the protection of
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adherence to the Berne Convention would seem to suggest that fixation in
some form is required.' The fact that Article 10(1) prescribes the basis by
which a work ought to be construed can be considered a condition of
constraint. If, by comparison, one were to look at U.S. copyright statutes,
one would find that the overarching claims for copyrightable work are
comparatively robust by virtue of the unambiguous use of the term
fixation.12 Perceptual availability is only the first step towards protection.
A work also needs to be reproducible and communicable. U.S. copyright
law is also flexible enough to allow for the possibility of technological
change and for that change to open up new avenues of fixing a work. If
the technological vehicle is of a kind whereby the artistic expression
remains intact, or at least withstands a change of medium, from analogue
to digital and from digital to, say, chemical; and if its persistence through
time is without the sacrifice of its intrinsic properties, then one can claim
it has the stability required for copyright protection. Stability resides in
fixation and in fixation alone, which is in the control of the author. By
contrast, under U.K. copyright law, the fixing of a work can be
undertaken by a third party.13
In the Dutch Copyright Act, there is no fixation requirement contained
within the statutes. But this alone should not enable an open-door policy
on copyright law. In the U.K., the Copyright Designs and Patents Act of
1988 does not explicitly contain a fixation requirement, nevertheless its
influence can be felt in a number of cases involving art works whose
expressive capacity fails to be materialized.4 Moreover, there is a general
assumption that if a work is defined as something over and above an idea
or a system, an expressive character needs to possess the attributes
enabling it to be experienced and reproduced. In other words, it needs to
be more than a sensory object of some kind. Judge Birss in Abraham
Moon & Sons v. Thornber gives weight to the idea of materiality in
relation to artistic expression:
Fixation is an important aspect of literary and artistic copyright
(c.f. Art 2 Berne Convention). Although s3(2) of the 1988 Act
only refers to literary, dramatic and musical work, and s4 has no
corresponding provision, I presume that is just because it is
assumed that s4(1) inevitably requires a record of the work in a
computer programs (NLOO6).
11. Article 2(2) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886).
12. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act (1976) contains the requirement that a work is
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."
13. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, section 3 (U.K.). A work can be fixed by a person
other than the author.
14. Merchandising Corporation v. Harpbond, [1983] FSR 32 (U.K.); & Creation Records v. New
Group Newspapers, [1997] E.M.L.R. 444 (U.K.).
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material form. 5
As construed, Section 4(a) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act is
a list of the types of subject matter deemed suitable for protection. The list
includes literary, dramatic and musical works, artistic works (defined by a
finite list: painting, sculpture, drawing, photograph, collage), film and
sound recording.16 An artistic work, if it is to be considered for protection,
needs to exemplify characteristics pertaining to one or more of the listed
categories. If it is a sculpture that is to be considered, then there are
certain assumptions as to its characteristics, although no statutory
definition is indicated. The most basic assumption is that it should possess
extension: that is, that the work occupy a position in space and be
observable from different angles. It is arguable whether occupation entails
a material basis for a sculptural work, as works can appear to take up
space and be observable from different points of view while being non-
material, as in the case of the hologram. Judge Laddie, in Metix v.
Maughan, opined that sculptural embodiment holds "with the shape or
appearance" rather than just with "achieving a precise functional effect.""
And Judge Mann, in his appeal to the encyclopedia definition of
sculpture, described a sculptural work as not only being a form rendered
in three dimensions, but of having an artistic purpose which distinguishes
it from three-dimensional objects of utility." Judge Mann distinguishes
works within the context of an exhibition space as being generally
recognized as possessing aesthetic purpose, which he views as a necessary
ingredient for being considered as artwork. To illustrate this point, he
describes the following scenario:
A pile of bricks, temporarily on display at the Tate Modern for
two weeks, is plainly capable of being a sculpture. The identical
pile of bricks dumped at the end of my driveway for two weeks
preparatory to a building project is equally plainly not. One asks
why there is that difference and the answer lies, in my view, in
having regard to its purpose. One is created by the hand of an
artist, for artistic purposes, and the other is created by a builder,
for building purposes.19
As to why Article 10 of Dutch copyright law is considered the gateway
to gustatory and olfactory works, one needs to look at the way in which it
has been interpreted. Clearly, the courts have favored a broad
15. Abraham Moon & Sons Ltd. v. Thomber, [2012] EWPCC 37, 104 (U.K.).
16. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 section 4(a) (U.K.).
17. Metix UK v. G.H. Maughan, [1997] FSR 722 (U.K.).
18. Lucasfilm Ltd v. Ainsworth, [2008] EWHC 1878, 15-18 (U.K.).
19. Lucasfilm Ltd v. Ainsworth, [2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch) 118 (viii) (U.K.).
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interpretation. Perhaps it is the overarching domain of literature, science,
and art upon which interpretation rests. But even if that were the case, it
would not answer the charge as to why works such as chemical formulae,
tastes, or perfume scent fit within this domain. Bernt Hugenholtz has
suggested that the trend in case law is to focus attention on the test of
originality and think about domain subsumption afterwards.20 He cites
several cases where a work is borderline.21 For example, in the case
Manfred Spaargaren Confiserie v. Da Vinci Bonbons & Chocolade, a
praline sweet was deemed, by the District Court of Amsterdam, as
possessing a taste that was worthy of copyright protection. In UK
copyright law the term artistic expression is embedded within each of the
categories contained within Section 4, but its domain does not extend to
that of a supervenient concept under which borderline art works such as
sound sculptures or landscape art or olfactory art can reside.
It is worth revisiting the Dutch case, Levola v. Smilde.22 Levola argues
for protection by virtue of the judgment given in the case Kecofa v.
Lanc6me.23 The part relevant to their claim is the following:
The description laid down in Art. 10 Auteurswet [Copyright Act] .
. . of types of works, of what must be understood to be a 'work' in
the sense of this Act, is put in general words and does not rule out
scents. This implies that as to the question of whether a scent
qualifies for protection under copyright law, or not, it is decisive
whether this concerns a product that is open to human perception
and whether it has an original character of its own and bears the
personal stamp of the maker. The notion of a work in the
Auteurswet does find its limits where a work's own original
character is no more than what is required to achieve a technical
effect, but considering that in case of a perfume there is no purely
technical effect, this last condition does not prevent granting
protection under copyright law to the scent of a perfume. The
circumstances that the properties of the human olfactory sense
limit the ability to distinguish scents and that the level to which
one can distinguish scents differs from one person to another, does
not alter the above, nor does the circumstance that the specific
nature of scents have the effect that not all provisions and
restrictions in the Auteurswet can directly apply, considering for
instance the use of perfume which cannot be denied to the
20. Bemt Hugenholtz, Works of Literature, Science and Art, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH
COPYRIGHT LAW (2012) (Neth.).
21. Hof Amsterdam 9 December 1999, (Top Scan/Sound Machine) (Neth.) BIE 2001, No. 87,
415.
22. Rb. Gelderland (Levola Hengelo BV/Smilde Foods BV) (Neth)., docket no. 272 772
2014/603.
23. HR 16 juni 2006, LJN AU 8940 (Kecofa/LancCme) (Neth.).
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ordinary user and which by its nature necessarily implies the
spreading of the scent.24
What is relevant to a case that concerned an infringement of a scent by
another is whether the work is available to human perception. If a work
bears the signature of its maker, and is perceptually available, then the
work should qualify for protection. The crux of the argument rests on
whether any sense of stability is needed for a work to be perceptually
present. Obliquely, the answer rests within Article 2(2) of the 1886 Berne
Convention: "works in general or any specified categories of works shall
not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form." If
fixation extends to a work's constitutive properties, then the question of
whether an olfactory work qualifies would be determined on molecular
composition, and on whether that structure possessed urability. Aroma-
chemicals are for the most part stable but subject to degradation by the
enzymes in the nose. So a court would have to ascertain the impact of
those enzymes, and to assess the level of change over time. "Open to
human perception" is a curious turn of phrase in the sense that if an object
is concealed, by the employment of meta-materials, or other camouflage
techniques, then its presence is not perceptually open.
Within the gamut of U.K. copyright law, the nature of the appearance
and the issue of whether a work of art possessing apparent rather than
substantive form is stable enough to warrant a claim of fixation are open
questions. Works of art whose structural properties are variable or whose
presence is evanescent, or whose presence is not sufficiently distinguished
from its immediate surroundings are considered borderline cases, and
their fate is at the discretion of the courts. This reveals a grey area
between the idea behind the work and its realization as material
expression. U.K. copyright law does not offer guidance as to what might
be considered as the minimum requirement for fixation. From Judge
Birss's point of view, the requirement of fixation is afforded to artistic
expression on the basis that it is materially realizable, which, in some
sense, over compensates its presence as an object within space.25 Being
tangible, or having features that possess tangibility, allows for a broader
interpretation from which artistic expression can be construed. But the
real problem in U.K. copyright law arises from the internal conflict
between the classification system, and the mode of fixation. Works of
artistic expression are generally taken to exemplify the way something
appears in space, as opposed to the way something occurs in time. Of
course tangible objects persist through time, but the point I am making is
24. Bernt Hugenholtz, Works of Literature, Science and Art, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH
COPYRIGHT LAw 51 (2012).
25. Abraham Moon & Sons Ltd v. Thomber, [2012] EWPCC 37,23 (U.K.).
[Vol 27:2340
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that artistic expression can be realized in sensory modalities other than
vision. But that would require a shift from the category of artistic
expression to that of sound recording or musical composition. What if
neither of those categories suit the work in question?
Consider an example of an artist who creates a series of sound
sculptures or events, which fall under the umbrella of sonic arts. As a
sculptor, the artist considers her material to be sound. Within this remit,
she produces unique pieces that are then exhibited at site-specific
locations. She makes a point of not recording or documenting the
artworks, preferring to view the work as sound sculptures made manifest
through audience participation. The only means of manipulating the
sound is by virtue of the acoustical characteristics of the chosen site. For
one piece, she uses a dome structure, similar to the Neolithic passage
graves in Scotland, which are notable for their unusual acoustics. The
participant is at liberty to activate the sound-sculpture by vocalization.
This in turn produces standing waves and/or Helmholtz resonance, which
in turn induces spatial disorientation and other intended psychological
effects in the participant. In another piece, her idea is to produce a work
with a degree of permanence by utilizing a resonant chamber's
extraordinary reverberation time. Again, the work requires participation in
activating the chamber's acoustics. The audience is given verbal
instruction as to suitable positions within the space and of intensity in
respect of vocalization. Each position produces a unique sound
occurrence, an acoustic shadow, or a whispering gallery effect, and each
sound phenomenon has attributes which reach beyond the recording
equipment pick-up capabilities.
Or what if the artist produces a sound installation that uses the
frequency range beyond human auditory perception, the ultrasonic range?
She produces this work by means of high-frequency pulses from bats that
have been specially trained to emit signals at pre-determined places in an
exhibition space. Although the sound work is conceived to be an
intangible sculpture, there are, at designated spots within the exhibition,
headphone and audio equipment enabling a person to listen to short
fragments of a transposed version of the sound installation.
And again, what of a work whose artistic expression involves the
absence of audible sound? An artist who creates a work using the material
of ultrasound could conceivably fix the work by transposing and
recording the resultant sound. Its stability would be ensured through the
particular sequence of digital bytes within the recording equipment; but if
a piece were to be expressed as a temporal duration, unperforated by
sound, then there would be some doubt. Arguably, a silent work, if
recorded and stored in audio format would possess a digital signature,
despite the lack of direct wavefront pressure input. Perhaps the capture of
slight air disturbances would be sufficient for its fixation. If, however, a
2015]1 341
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silence installation was presented in an anechoic chamber, the lack of
external input could reduce the encoded information to nothing more than
the noise interference emissions from the audio equipment itself. To view
silence as artistic expression, in any case, is problematic, in so far as it
lacks the definition required for even the broadest interpretation of artistic
expression, irrespective of the view that a silent occurrence bound within
the context of a gallery is a work beyond the domain of idea.
The emergence of sonic arts as a form of expression for artists in the
last decade has thrown up some interesting dilemmas, especially when
many of those artists choose to make the work without the aid of audio
equipment. The example of the artist who creates work by harnessing the
acoustics in a given place is one example of the difficulties facing
copyright protection. It is conceivable that the artist could describe in
written form the coordinates of each acoustical phenomenon in the work,
thus fixing the work in literary form. But what if she decides not to do so,
and instead argues that length of reverberation time in works that are
activated in acoustically resonant chambers is sufficient to ensure that
they fall outside of the definition of ephemeral. She might argue that her
work is not only a case of artistic expression made manifest in tangible
form, but that the sounds produced in such an environment exist beyond
the natural life of sounds as such and that those sounds, irrespective of
alterations in spectral character over time, would be grounds enough to
warrant fixation.
The case of Kecofa v. Lancome has many incarnations, starting with a
hearing at the Rechtbank in Maastricht in 2002, where the possibility of
copyright protection for perfume scents was first raised. Lanc6me needed
to satisfy the court that their product possessed an original and authorial
character, and that Kecofa's perfume reproduced that distinctive
character. In the subsequent appeals,26 Lanc6me's claim of infringement
was upheld, and, in 2006, the High Court opined that the scent, rather than
the liquid contained in the bottle, could be protected by virtue of its
reactive properties in effecting the olfactory sense. The scent was then
construed as a sensory mediator connecting the percipient to the chemical
composition, such that a claim can be made that aroma-chemicals are
perceptual. The step taken in Levola v. Smilde seems to further erode the
concept of fixation. The basis of the hearing is not to analyze ingredients
but to show that reproduction of a taste has taken place.
26. Hof Den Bosch 8 juni 2004, JAR 2004 (Kccofa/Lanc6me) (Neth.); HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006
585 (Kccofa v. Lanc6me) (Neth.).
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